More than forty years ago Ward Edwards (1954) pub-mention: The first concerns the unresolved dialectic lished his seminal paper ''The Theory of Decision Mak-tension between normative and descriptive outlooks. ing'' which marked the birth of Behavioral Decision The origins of decision theory lie entirely in the normaMaking (henceforth BDM). Recently, Edwards was in-tive domain. For a long time it was believed, implicitly vited by the editor of Organizational Behavior and Hu-or explicitly, that the normative theory presents not man Decision Processes to write a paper reflecting on only the ought but also the is: The normative and dethe developments in the field during the past four de-scriptive facets were assumed to be one and the same. cades. Rather than delivering the expected survey and The evidence accumulated in the last 40 years has unan overview of ''the state of the art,'' Edwards chose to equivocally shown that this assumption is unwarsubmit a more specific paper on multiattribute utility ranted. Apparently, human behavior often deviates in measurement (Edwards and Hutton Barron, 1995). I consistent and systematic ways from normative prebelieve that Ward's decision was a rational one and scriptions. Despite their different nature ''descriptive well calculated since writing such a paper, under the and normative theories are deeply interrelated in most page limits imposed by a journal article, seems an im-applications'' (Coombs, Dawes, and Tversky, 1970, p. possible mission.
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cades. Rather than delivering the expected survey and The evidence accumulated in the last 40 years has unan overview of ''the state of the art,'' Edwards chose to equivocally shown that this assumption is unwarsubmit a more specific paper on multiattribute utility ranted. Apparently, human behavior often deviates in measurement (Edwards and Hutton Barron, 1995) . I consistent and systematic ways from normative prebelieve that Ward's decision was a rational one and scriptions. Despite their different nature ''descriptive well calculated since writing such a paper, under the and normative theories are deeply interrelated in most page limits imposed by a journal article, seems an im-applications'' (Coombs, Dawes, and Tversky, 1970, p. possible mission. 114) , and are separated by a very fuzzy line. It is this The aim of the present special issue is to attempt the interrelation and the difficulties associated with disenimpossible task on a rather small and very limited tangling the two facets that contribute to the strain scale. Although they are far from exhausting this ever between the two outlooks. growing field, the following articles encompass a wide
The second common underlying thread is the interspectrum of central issues in BDM. Many of these is-play between cognitive and noncognitive factors in acsues are the focus of heated controversy. Indeed, this counting for human behavior in general and judgment was a major criterion for selecting these articles. Au-and decision making in particular. A tacit assumption thors were encouraged to adopt a forward-looking view underlying the normative view is that decisions are and were given the freedom to express unorthodox (and ought to be) made solely on rational grounds. Acideas that might have had a difficult time making it cording to this view, noncognitive factors such as emopast the homogenizing hurdle of conventional peer re-tions, motivations, or moral considerations should have view. In addition, to highlight the controversies and no impact on the decision process unless they can be provide a balanced coverage, each article is accompa-transformed and justified by rational means. Both canied by one or more commentaries. In combination, sual observations as well as growing empirical evidence the primary articles and the commentaries that follow suggest that such an assumption is irreconcilable with yield a broad assessment of what has been achieved, any tenable descriptive theory. Indeed, the role of afand provide a rich and stimulating outlook for future fection in shaping preferences and judgments has reresearch.
cently received growing attention as is also reflected in The different articles, and the corresponding com-many of the following articles and commentaries. A mentaries, allude to distinctive separate issues, yet major challenge for students of BDM would be to intethere are several underlying themes shared by most grate and combine the passions and ethical consideraif not all of them. Two common themes merit special tions into current cognitive (and more specifically, ra-judged to be rational or irrational. Her concern is not with verification of the normative rule (by formal logitional) oriented models of decision making.
cal mathematical rules), but rather its justification. The other question she raises concerns the criteria by
NORMATIVE VS DESCRIPTIVE PERSPECTIVES
which a normative theory, specifically utility theory, can be judged as being descriptively adequate. A major impetus to Edwards ' (1954) Neuman and Morgenstern (1944) . Two addi-quate normative model and rejecting all other alternational books appeared around the same time as Ed-tives, for instance one that would take the probability wards' paper and had a profound influence on the de-of success into account. Why is this less rational than velopment of the field. One was a book by Savage the rules derived from the normatively founded utility (1954) , entitled The Foundation of Statistics, which of-theory? fered a concise and formal treatment of subjective prob-
The question of what warrants a normative rule can abilities and served as a major building block for the be answered in two different ways. The more common subjective version of utility theory. The other book, by approach is based on accepting the canons of logic and Luce and Raiffa (1957) , entitled Games and Decisions, mathematics which lie at the heart of the scientific was an updated version of von Neuman and Morgenst-enterprise. Lopes (following Hammond) refers to it as ern's book and became a classic, which it remains until the coherence approach. It entails fundamental rules this day. All these sources shared a purely normative such as consistency and transitivity and, more specifiperspective. The most fundamental assumption under-cally in the context of choice, principles like dominance lying this approach was the existence of a rational and representational invariance. This is the approach agent or what has been termed in the economic litera-adopted by Luce in his comment on Lopes' article. He ture ''economic man. '' claims that people accept the fundamental dictates of With a few exceptional comments, the descriptive rationality (as reflected in the normative perspective) aspect was largely neglected. There was little aspira-even if they fail to implement them successfully under tion to account and explain human behavior. Even the certain circumstances.
most transparent cases of discrepancy between norma-
The other approach, which is more loosely defined, tive models and human behavior did not change the is based on considerations of reasonableness. For indominating outlook. A typical example is Savage's stance, Lopes is questioning why a rule such as ''max-(1954) response to Allais' paradox: Accepting the Incon-imizing the probability of coming ahead'' should be consistency revealed by Allais (1953) , ''Savage is grateful sidered less sensible than that of maximizing expected to the theory for indicating his inconsistency and he utility. But what are the standards by which one could promptly reappraises his evaluations'' (Luce and judge whether a decision is reasonable or sensible? DeRaiffa, 1957, p. 25) . Apparently, it was human behavior spite the lack of strict criteria to determine reasonablethat was supposed to change, not the theory that was ness, there are two tacit assumptions underlying the in principle correct.
term. Accordingly, a reasonable act or decision is one The past forty years have witnessed a gradual transi-that (i) can be justified and supported by arguments, tion (which is briefly summarized in Svenson's article and (ii) will supposedly be endorsed by most people in this issue) in which the descriptive facet has received (after sufficient deliberations). Note that the required ever growing attention leading to what is nowadays reasoning in (i) is supposed to provide ''adequate'' justireferred to as Behavioral Decision Making. Nonethe-fication, though often the justification may be qualitaless, the strain between the normative and the descrip-tive in nature and hence not lend itself easily to a pretive facets has not been resolved, as exemplified in sev-cise quantitative formulation. Hence, it does not have eral of the papers in this issue.
to strictly satisfy formal normative requirements. 3 Also Lola Lopes, a longstanding adversary of the strict normative approach (e.g., Lopes, 1987) , challenges in her present article not just the descriptive adequacy note that (ii) is based on observations though these resulting from the normative-descriptive distinction, and includes an implicit critic of utility theory, though are often based on informal and intuitive procedures. Unlike the coherence approach which centers on consis-from an entirely different perspective. Utility theory has been by far the most dominating theory in the field tency and for which there are unequivocal well-defined criteria (with absolute distinctions between ''true'' and since its inception. The origins of the theory can be traced to studies of gambling in the 17th century, and ''wrong''), the approach based on reasonableness is more diffused yet may get closer to accurately describ-was formulated in terms of choice among gambles.
Much of decision theory (and subsequently BDM) has ing how people make their decisions and what they want to achieve. According to this view, there is an adopted this simplifying strategy in which any decision is assumed (implicitly or explicitly) to be equivalent important descriptive component in determining normative directions.
to a choice among gambles. Accordingly, the decision maker is a boundedly rational gambler engaged in seThe other issue addressed by Lopes concerns the adelecting the best one among an available set. The advanquacy of current descriptive models that are founded tage of the so-called ''gambling paradigm'' was that it on normative grounds. She advocates a dual model simplified the complexity underlying most decisions combining an expectation or averaging principle (like and enabled the collection of empirical data (in well in utility theory) and a process that will maximize the controled experimental settings) thus providing the approbability of being ahead, or more generally of a cerpropriate data for testing formal models such as utility tain aspiration level. Schoemaker and Hershey remark theory. that such a dual rationality criterion ''seems very reasonable descriptively but murky normatively.'' Lopes' Fischhoff starts his article by contrasting two choice problems: One concerns a laboratory task in a controled point, however, is that the descriptive facet should be judged aside from normative considerations, though experiment of choosing between two gambles (Fischhoff, Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1980) , which is represenshe also adds some reasons why the dual criterion may also be normatively attractive.
tative of the ''gambling paradigm.'' The other is a protocol description (Fischhoff, Furby, Quadrel and RichardSchoemaker and Hershey assert that normative and son, 1991) of a decision faced by a teenager who has to descriptive considerations are constantly interwoven decide between participating in the graduation party in Lopes' article, which leads them to remark that of her cousin and going for the weekend to visit an old they found it difficult to comment on her paper. I beand close friend. This kind of messy and unstructured lieve that the difficulty is inherent in the field and decision process is, according to Fischhoff, more typical not in Lopes' paper per se. Indeed, Schoemaker and and more representative than the artificial, impoverHershey themselves shift back and forth between the ished gambling experiment. two perspectives, thus demonstrating the twofold relationship between the normative and descriptive fac-
The problem of ecological validity, which is the focus of Fischhoff's paper, is certainly not new (e.g., Winkler ets. They admit that from a descriptive viewpoint coherence is often violated, and thus ''should not feature and Murphy, 1973 , Hogarth, 1986 . Although the gambling paradigm offers a narrow scope, is often artificial, prominently in behavioral models''; yet they ''deem it an important condition of rational choice and judg-and has suppressed many features of the decision process (e.g., Kahneman 1993), the alternative as prement.'' How can these views be reconciled? Schoemaker and Hershey describe a simulation test of the sented by Fischhoff is not without caveats. Specifically, crude observations and the unstructured data obtained ''probability of coming ahead'' principle as proposed by Lopes. On the basis of their results, they conclude by protocols do not lend themselves easily to rigorous analysis, thus making it difficult, if not impossible, to that despite the fact that the rule is not optimal (and thus incompatible with normative dictates), it is a rea-choose between competing interpretations. Such data are frequently inadequate for testing existing models sonable one. Note that the criterion for reasonableness they employ is determined by a purely normative which focus on a limited number of variables that cannot be isolated from the data. bench mark, namely that of expected utility, the validity of which is questioned by Lopes. It is exactly at
We are thus faced with two possible perspectives. this point that issues regarding the normative and One that advocates well structured unambiguous descriptive facets often get confused, specifically, in tasks, like choosing between two gambles, constructed my opinion, because the criteria of what is reasonable for the test of a well formulated model or a specific and the criteria used for claiming normativeness are derived hypothesis. Such tasks, though artificial, pernot being stated explicitly. mit clear-cut and well defined interpretations yet provide a narrow and incomplete portrayal of human deciThe article by Fischhoff also alludes to the strain sion making behavior. The alternative is a broader and portion of correct responses. While formally subjective probabilities are only subject to coherence requiremore comprehensive perspective that captures the ments, Brenner et al. propose that probability statecomplexity of real life, albeit a reality that is so diverse ments are being used for communication purposes and and messy that we still lack the appropriate tools to thus it is likely that one would tacitly apply a fredescribe it accurately and in a parsimonious manner. quentistic interpretation to unique subjective judgOne of Fischhoff's main concerns is the impact of ments. As they say, ''A client who is informed by her decision theory on real-life applications, and he seems lawyer that her chances for winning the case are 99% to believe that the best way is to proceed on two fronts. may be justifiably upset to learn that when the lawyer Accordingly, the role of normative analysis would be to expresses a 99% confidence he is actually correct only sharpen and clarify one's thinking, whereas studies 75% of the time''. Brenner et al. decline to provide an that ''turn subjects loose'' (like those described in Fischexplicit justification for using a frequentistic criterion hoff's article) may illuminate important hidden asfor evaluating unique subjective probabilities; yet acpects, thus getting us closer to the real world. The recording to my interpretation the criterion is based on sults of such a combined approach are often referred reasonableness (as reflected in the above quotation), to as the ''prescriptive'' view (e.g., Bell, Raiffa and Tversimilar to what I discussed earlier. sky, 1988) , though the term has never been well defined Beside the formal question of whether average conand carries little meaning except for implying a comfidence should match the corresponding proportion corpromising spirit.
rect, there is a more descriptive and empirical question The blend of descriptive and normative consideraaddressed by Brenner et al., namely how do probability tions is not limited to utility theory. The articles by judgments for single events compare with judgments Dawes and Mulford, and by Brenner, Koehler, Liberof relative frequency. Their results show that the two man, and Tversky address the issue of accuracy of probare indistinguishable, at least in that both exhibit subability judgments usually referred to as calibration. stantial overconfidence. Evidently, overconfidence reBoth examine the extent to which the frequently remains a pervasive phenomenon, deeply rooted, and apported overconfidence phenomenon (Keren 1991 , for a plies regardless of whether single event probabilities recent review) is indeed real and not a result of some or relative frequencies are involved. methodological artifacts.
Dawes and Mulford, in their article, suggest that the Like most students of BDM in general, and of calibra-prevalent overconfidence phenomenon, and the sotion in particular, the authors of both papers adopt a called hard/easy effect (i.e., the interaction between subjectivist view according to which a probability state-overconfidence and difficulty of the task) may, to a large ment reflects a person's degree of belief and as such extent, be an artifact of regression toward the mean, a constitutes a purely internal state. Yet, in their analy-point made earlier by Erev, Wallsten, and Budescu, ses they follow the common practice of assessing the (1994). Brenner et al., however, show that, at least in ''accuracy'' of probability judgments by a plain fre-their study, regression toward the mean cannot fully quentistic criterion (i.e., proportion correct forecasts). account for the observed overconfidence, a conclusion Probability theory is in essence a mathematical theory which is probably applicable to other studies as well, (the most accepted version is based on Kolmogorov's as also noted by Griffin and Varey in their commentary. axioms and definitions), yet it is associated with differThere is another important point to be made. The ent interpretations. It is at the level of interpretation explanation offered by Dawes and Mulford is an intethat disagreements occur, and various reconciliation gral part of the subsumed formal model. As noticed attempts (e.g., Lindley, Tversky, and Brown, 1979; by Harrison and March (1984) , regression toward the Shafer, 1993 ) have had at best a limited success. Differ-mean is inherent in any prediction model. But regresences in interpretation arise on both the normative and sion is merely a set of conditional averages and regresthe descriptive facet: At the normative level there is sion toward the mean is a built-in consequence of the the unsettled controversy between subjectivists and process implicit in the model. Although structural feafrequentists (an enlightening presentation is offered by tures, like regression toward the mean, may often play Salmon, 1967) ; at the descriptive level it is not clear a dominant role (and thus are extremely important to which (if any) of the formal interpretations are adopted be identified), they should not be construed as a behavby lay people.
ioral explanation. Given that, as suggested by Brenner Brenner et al. directly address the debate between et al. and some other recent studies (e.g., Budescu, Erev the frequentist and the subjectivist interpretations, and Wallsten, 1995), overconfidence is not entirely an and specifically examine the meaningfulness of evalu-artifact we still lack a satisfactory psychological explanation of overconfidence. ating average subjective probability judgments by pro-Commenting on the articles by Brenner et al. and probability assessment. 6 This is the major theme of Svenson's article in which he points out that a strucDawes and Mulford, Wallsten examines different tural approach cannot capture all the different facets of types of tasks used in calibration studies and the decision making and thus advocates a complementary corresponding analyses employed in these studies.
process-tracing perspective. Wallsten also notes that the research on calibration
The search for the mediating processes and the gehas been characterized by slow progress in identineric regularities underlying a decision is certainly a fying the cognitive processes underlying probability fundamental and integral part of behavioral decision judgments. There are at least two reasons that can making. It can be achieved, however, in more than one account for this slow progress.
way. The gambling paradigm that has dominated the First, with very few exceptions, all studies of calibrafield for the past forty years, and which has directly tion have adopted a formal analytical approach. Speevolved from the normative perspective, certainly procifically, researchers have tacitly assumed that their vided important and useful insights. Not only did it subjects share the same normative stance with regard enable the pointing out of deviations from what is preto what are ''good'' probability assessors, and have evalscribed by the corresponding normative model; in many uated their subjects' performance accordingly (by calicases those deviations were shown to be robust and bration curves and corresponding measures of calibrasystematic. For instance, the research program on heution). 4 A recent study by Yates, Price, Lee, and Ramirez ristics and biases resulted in identifying some basic (in press) suggests reliable and important differences processes like representativeness, availability, anchorbetween subjects' subjective appraisal of probability ing and adjustment, and prominence (i.e., attention is judgments and formal evaluation principles. Rather directed to prominent features which affect the decision than making probability judgments, subjects in the exprocess in regular and predicted ways), to mention just periment by Yates et al. were asked (as customers of a few. An unanswered question, however, is whether probabilistic information) to evaluate different forethe portrayal of decision making as accomplished by casts. Unlike the normative criteria, subjects especially the gambling paradigm is complete. Even Kahneman valued categorically ''correct'' judgments, paid special (1993), one of the most successful practitioners of this attention to forecast extremeness, and had a desire for paradigm, has recently pointed out the limitations of good explanations of forecasts. From a descriptive the paradigm. viewpoint, these results suggest that subjects may try An alternative, and in may respects complementary, to maximize something different from what is assumed way is to set aside the strictly controlled experiments, by the experimenters. Whereas the latter emphasize and rely more on other methods for eliciting the underthe accuracy of probability judgments, the former tend lying processes, such as the use of verbal protocols. to appraise such judgments by their discriminability 5 This is the approach advocated by both Fischhoff and for practical purposes. Thus, a forecast of 90% chance Svenson in this issue. Although methods for protocol of rain is valued more than a 50% chance of rain (reanalysis have been refined (e.g., Ericsson and Simon, gardless of the accuracy of these two judgments) be-1993), they have nevertheless been subject to continucause the former clearly implies to take an umbrella ous criticism (e.g. Nisbett and Wilson, 1977;  Wilson, whereas for the later prediction one remains indecisive. 1994) and do not enable the rigorous inferences afThese results cast doubts on whether the normative forded by the controled experimental method. yardsticks used to evaluate probability judgments are There are at least three ways by which one may think the appropriate ones.
about the role of protocols. 7 In Simon's work protocols A second point is that most of the calibration experi-are conceived as testable theories in necessarily rements have focused on what Svenson, in his article, stricted domains. According to a second view, protocols refers to as structural variables. Although these stud-may be considered as nontestable accounts that are ies enabled important insights, we still know little judged by their robustness and the method of elicitaabout the underlying processes that lead to the final tion (e.g., Gilligan, 1982) . Finally, protocols may be used for an explicit comparison with common controlled experimental methods. Such a comparison can be car-4 Even from a normative view, the question of what constitutes ried out in two directions: (i) first, interesting phenomgood probability assessors and how they should be appraised remains controversial (e.g., . 6 One of the few exceptions is the study by Koriat, Lichtenstein, 5 In the common calibration terminology (e.g., Keren 1991), subjects placed more value on good ''resolution'' (i.e., the ability to dis-and Fischhoff (1980) , although some researchers report difficulties in replicating the results. criminate between events) than on ''calibration'' (i.e., accuracy of forecasts).
7 I thank B. Fischhoff for pointing out these distinctions.
ena informally derived from protocols, may be sub-steps, subject to the formal canons of logical reasoning. The loose view, in contrast, is characterized by more jected to more rigorous controled experiments, or (ii) flexible forms and is controlled by what I referred to protocols can be used as opportunities to corroborate as reasonable or sensible. The two views also differ in the extent to which laboratory phenomena also show that the former is abstract and timeless, whereas the up in more lifelike surroundings. It is in this manner latter is more concrete and temporal. The normative that protocols are used by both Fischhoff and Svenson.
facet is an integral and inherent part of the strict view. The contrast between (i) and (ii) is not minor. The However, decision making as it is practiced in the real first is the more common approach practiced by BDM world has an unavoidable component of art. To capture students. Based on casual or contrived observations this component, research within the descriptive facet or protocols, derived phenomena are placed in formal may benefit from a looser orientation. models which are then (customarily) tested by rigorous experimentation. The formal models, implicitly or ex-
VOLITIONAL BEHAVIOR AND AFFECT:
plicitly, place the behavioral phenomena in a norma-
THE ROLE OF EMOTIONS
tive framework based on the assumptions of rationality. In fact, the mathematical and logical tools which
The emergence of BDM in the mid-fifties coincided are the essence of formal models, are an inherent com-with the rise of what has become known as the cogniponent of the rational outlook. In contrast, the ap-tive revolution. The unprecedent advancements in the proach outlined in (ii) does not presuppose rationality physical sciences and information theory and the realas a necessary condition. It takes a more neutral stance ization of the enormous capabilities inherent in comand examines the extent to which the rationality as-puting machines and information technology led to an sumption is indeed warranted. Descriptively, this ap-unshaken belief in our cognitive abilities. Within the proach may provide a more reliable portrayal of the social sciences, particularly psychology, there was a real life.
reaction to both psychoanalysis (with its dark, affective My own interpretation of the articles by Fischhoff account of seemingly inappropriate behavior) and beand Svenson is that too much weight has been placed haviorism (which, in the extreme version, portrayed on the first approach. The best route for progress would humans as automatons shaped by conditioning). Both probably be reached by proceeding along both (i) and schools seemed to undermine our cognitive competence (ii), accepting the inevitable limitations of each. Such and in turn our abilities to control our lives. an approach may enable closing a gap which, as Teigen These developments have strengthened and nursuggests in his commentary, may be referred to as the tured the belief in the rational agents (or economic gap between ''normative'' vs ''descriptive'' facets, ''ba-men) who were considered to be in full control of their sic'' vs ''applied'' research, or ''surrogate'' vs ''real life'' thoughts and actions, and capable to follow the normasituations. Needless to say that these terms are highly tive desiderata. Decision failures were exclusively atinterrelated.
tributed to the perceptual-cognitive machine and could, In this section I have tried to briefly portray the intri-it was assumed, be avoided by increasing mental effort cate relationship between the normative and descrip-and by appropriate training. Consequently, the presuptive views as reflected in many of the articles in this position that normative models (with, conceivably, issue. The difficulties associated with reconciling be-some minor modifications) can concurrently serve detween the two perspectives are many and complex yet scriptive accounts was introduced with little contwo aspects are, in my opinion, standing out. One con-tention. For example, in a frequently quoted article, cerns the difference in the evaluation criteria employed Peterson and Beach (1967) concluded that ''In general, to appraise models: The major criterion for assessing the results indicate that probability theory and statisnormative models is efficacy whereas for descriptive tics can be used as the basis for psychological models models it is accuracy, or more precisely correspondence that integrate and account for human performance in with the real world. While these two criteria are not a wide range of inferential tasks'' (p. 29). necessarily contradictory, they remain to be different Subsequent work initiated by Kahneman and Tverand occasionally incompatible.
sky (e.g., Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, 1982) has The second aspect concerns two opposing conceptual seriously questioned the validity of the rational agent outlooks which, borrowing (with some slight modifica-assumption. Much of this research, under the heading tions) from Rips (1990) who applied these terms to the of ''heuristics and biases,'' portrayed decision makers study of reasoning, I will call the strict and the loose as imperfect information processing systems that are views. The strict view is identified by a rigid structure prone to different types of error. Though these conclusions, and the research on which they were based, have in which reasoning is assumed to proceed in discrete been subject to heated debates (e.g., Cohen, 1981; Gi-in 
Loewenstein's article is the most outspoken attempt gerenzer, 1991; Kahneman and Tversky, in press) that have not been yet resolved, both proponents and oppo-to broaden the field by introducing emotional and motivational factors into BDM. nents shared several tacit assumptions that were seldom challenged. In particular, it was (and to a large Loewenstein's article is focusing on what he terms extent still is) assumed that judgments and choices are visceral factors (such as hunger, pain, anger, sex, curimainly cognitive in nature and consequently should osity) which, he suggests, exert direct hedonic impact be explained at this level. The cognitive information on the decision maker and influence the relative desirprocessing paradigm that dominated psychology since ability of different goods and actions. Visceral factors the mid-sixties provided the proper background for this are adoptive and important to ensure the organism's approach.
survival yet as long as they are weak they may be controlled by rational deliberations. As the intensity of Several papers in the current issue contest, or at least question, the validity of some basic presumptions a visceral factor escalates, it draws increasing attention to activities and outcomes that will satisfy it (and and common premises that became an integral part of the conceptual arsenal of BDM. In his article, George eventually reduce its intensity). In economic terms, the rate of substitution between goods and actions that will Loewenstein probably provides the most far reaching and provocative challenge to the current paradigm. He satisfy the visceral factor and other alternatives (not associated with the relevant visceral factor) becomes challenges the tacit assumption, adopted by the majority of BDM researchers, that judgments and choice are infinitesimal. Following Loewenstein, visceral factors may influence the decision maker in two additional entirely controlled by our cognitions. Following Loewenstein, much of our behavior is nonvolitional ways: First, by shifting attention and overweighing present desires that may result in short-sighted tradeeven if it seems to be so. Noncognitive factors such as emotions, habits, and motivation may exert their offs between immediate and delayed rewards (i.e., elevating myopic behavior); second, by leading to narinfluence on the decision process and often play a major role in how the final decision is reached.
rowing attention toward the self in comparison with others, resulting in increased selfish behavior and unAs Strack notes in his commentary, the idea is not dermining altruism. The alleged influences of visceral novel. There is a long history to the debate on whether factors are converted by Loewenstein into seven well humans' behavior is ruled by passions or by the mind.
defined and testable propositions. This controversy has been well articulated in the book by Janis and Mann (1977) , who were among the first
The conclusion drawn by Loewenstein is that, contrary to what is assumed by most researchers of BDM, in the field of BDM to offer a systematic treatment of the role of motivation and affect in the decision process. ''much behavior is nonvolitional or only partly volitional-even in situations characterized by substantial Specifically, they proposed to distinguish between what they termed cold and hot decisions: in the former case deliberation.'' The question is not just whether people possess the appropriate cognitive (intellectual) tools to the decision maker, who is tacitly assumed to stay aloof with regard to the consequences, carefully weighs and cope with decision problems according to the ''rationality'' standards, but when and to what extent visceral evaluates the different aspects of the problem and applies a logical and well formulated analysis to reach a factors can be put under control. final decision. The latter case refers to a highly involved How can visceral and other noncognitive factors be decision maker whose decision processes are character-incorporated into current research of BDM? There is ized (and often hindered) by passions, desires, motiva-no unanimous answer to this question, as reflected in tions, and impatience. An implicit criticism implied by the three commentaries on Loewenstein's article. Janis and Mann is that most of BDM research has Baron, as the title of his commentary suggests, is focused on cold decisions, whereas in real life hot deci-trying to defend what he calls the not-so-old-time relisions are more common.
gion, that is, decision theory in which the rationality concept is central. He believes that adding motivation Though frequently cited, the book had relatively and emotion to the current BDM agenda can be done little impact and its implications were suppressed by within the same theoretical framework and experimenthe dominating view of rationality. More recently, tal paradigm. It can simply be viewed as an important there has been a growing number of articles that foextension of the same approach. cused on the affective facets of the decision process. Assessing current trends in BDM, Kahneman (1993) Rachlin, on the other hand, interprets Loewenstein's paper as a justified indictment of the cognitive has explicitly documented the shortcomings of the gambling paradigm and appealed for its expansion approach that fails to account for the influence of non-cognitive factors. Unlike Baron, he believes that the commentaries of this issue. The rule of ''maximizing the probability of being ahead,'' proposed by Lopes, is current framework of BDM is unable to adequately assimilate the noncognitive factors. He offers instead associated with the desire to minimize the potential regret in the face of disagreeable outcomes. Moreover, a postbehaviorist theory labeled ''Teleological behaviorism'' (Rachlin, 1992) which he claims can concur-the lapse of time until uncertainty is resolved (regardless of the outcome) may carry such negative feelings rently accommodate both cognitive and non-cognitive factors and account for all the seven propositions of that one may be willing to pay a high premium such as abandoning the principle of maximizing expectation. Loewenstein. According to Rachlin, whereas in Loewenstein's model the struggle between mind and Arkes, commenting on Svenson's article, also chalpassions is ''taking place somewhere in the brain be-lenges the presumption that behavior can be entirely tween an internal and cognitive decision process and explained in information processing terms. He reminds visceral factors'', from the viewpoint of teleological be-us on the distinction between ''hot'' and ''cold'' cognihaviorism ''the battle between passion and reason is tions introduced by Abelson (Janis and Mann use the fought wholly on the behavioral level''. two terms slightly different). Cold errors are assumed to be unmotivated and considered to be the conseRegardless of whether teleological behaviorism is a tenable alternative model, Rachlin makes an im-quence of the normal operations of the human information processing system, such as errors resulting from portant, and in my opinion a valid, point; there is a fundamental difference between what people decide to ''heuristics and biases'' (e.g., Kahneman, et al. 1982) .
Hot cognitive errors are said to be motivated mistakes; do as opposed to what they do, a distinction that has often been ignored by students of BDM.
Citing Greenwald (1980) , Arkes cites egocentricity (self as the focus of knowledge) and ''beneffectance'' (percepFinally, Strack is embedding Loewenstein's proposition of responsibility for desired, but not undesired, tions in yet another attempt (e.g., Stepper and Strack, outcomes) as sources for motivated hot errors. Note 1993) to integrate visceral factors and more deliberative that the motivations underlying hot cognitions cannot processes under one theoretical umbrella. Specifically, be entirely explained in information processing terms. Strack suggests that people posses two modes of represenConsequently, methods to reduce errors resulting from tations of their environment and themselves: A conceptual hot or cold cognitions, should clearly be differentiated. one which he terms noetic and a perceptual one which he terms experiential, where the former corresponds to A brief scan of recent research of BDM suggests that affect and other non-cognitive facets gradually receive knowledge and the later to feeling. Strack describes briefly a theoretical framework which determines the con-a growing amount of attention. For instance, concepts such as fairness (e.g., Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, ditions under which either of the two modes will control epistemic and behavioral decisions.
1986) and regret (e.g., Loomes and Sugden, 1982, 1987) have been shown to play an important role in the deciWhile each of the three commentaries offers a different sion process. Regardless of how these concepts are deperspective on the manner by which visceral (or more fined (they certainly are associated with more than one generally, noncognitive) factors may operate, they are all interpretation), they clearly contain affective compoin agreement with Loewenstein about the importance of nents. The open question is whether such emotional these factors in the study of BDM. Other articles in the and motivational components can be adequately cappresent issue also endorse tacitly Loewenstein's plea for tured by the dominant rational models, and it is on this acknowledging the role of noncognitive factors that until question where I believe researchers may be divided. recently have been undermined. Fischhoff, for instance, maintains that real-life decisions are many-sided and Similar to the framework presented in Strack's comricher than what is subsumed by the synthetic gambling mentary, Bruner (1984) has proposed the existence of paradigm. The protocols of his subjects, describing im-two different modes of reasoning that differ in the way portant decisions that they had to face, contain emotion-of ordering experience and constructing reality. One ally loaded conflicts that cannot be resolved by exclusive mode, termed paradigmatic, is founded on tight analyrational deliberations. Among other things, Fischhoff's ar-sis and logical proof based on formal verification proceticle implies that failures of cognition (e.g., the inability dures and empirical evidence, and is regulated by reto think one's way through to clear choices) can produce quirements of non-contradiction. It is this mode of reaaffect which can, in turn, effect those choices. Note that soning which is assumed to govern the decisions of a usually the assumption is that the causation goes in the ''rational agent.'' The other mode, termed narrative, is other direction. experiential in nature thus containing non-cognitive facets such as affect, esthetics, and ethics. According A plea to incorporate affection as an important component in BDM is also reflected in other articles and to Bruner, one of the major differences between the two
